Chapter 1 Brownian Motion
In these notes we build the objects the rest of the book computes with. Filtrations and martingales first, then the Itô integral — which is defined by a limit that is not obviously there, so we show why it exists rather than assuming it, and find that the Itô isometry is what supplies the limit rather than merely describing it. Along the way the Stratonovich integral appears as the alternative that obeys the ordinary chain rule and is not adapted, which is the trade between geometry and predictability. The chapter ends with Itô’s lemma and the diffusions it applies to.
1.1 Stochastic Processes
Definition 1.1 (Brownian Motion).
A brownian motion is a stochastic process such that the following properties hold:
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with probability 1.
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where is a Normal distribution with mean m and variance v.
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and are independent random variables for .
So the process starts at zero, moves by independent normal steps, and a step’s variance is exactly its length — which is why the path accumulates randomness at a constant, known rate.
Definition 1.2 (-Algebra).
A -algebra on a set X is a collection of subsets of X such that the following properties hold:
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(closed under complement)
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(closed under countable union)
A probability is a map assigning a number to each event in — so the -algebra is exactly the collection of events whose probability is known, and the closure axioms say that knowing an event’s probability means knowing its complement’s and any countable combination’s as well.
Definition 1.3 (Filtration).
A filtration is an indexed -algebra of subsets of the probability sample space such that for .
So is the information available at time — a finer -algebra distinguishes more events — and the nesting condition says that information only grows: nothing is forgotten as increases.
Definition 1.4 (Measurable Function).
Given a -algebra on the sample space , a real-valued random variable X is -measurable if the X-inverse of any open set in is contained in i.e.
So observing the value of a measurable function identifies an event already in — the set of outcomes consistent with that observation — which is what lets “know” the function’s value.
Definition 1.5 (Adapted Process).
A stochastic process is adapted to filtration if for each t, is measurable.
So a process adapted to has a value at time already implied by the information available then — nothing about is still hidden from .
Definition 1.6 (Generated Filtration).
The filtration generated by a stochastic process is the smallest filtration to which the process is adapted.
Example 1.1.
Let’s take an example of 3 unbiased coin tosses with process counting the number of heads until toss t. The probability sample space is
The filtration generated by the process is
| and all unions of the above | |||
| and all unions of the above | |||
| and all unions of the above | |||
Definition 1.7 (Expectation conditional on filtration).
is the measurable random variable such that
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So averaging over any event can see gives the same answer whether or not is first replaced by its conditional expectation — is the -measurable random variable that matches ’s average on every event can distinguish, even though it need not match itself.
In the coin toss example above,
Definition 1.8 (Martingale).
A stochastic process is a martingale with respect to a filtration of the probability space if
So a martingale’s expected future value, conditional on the present, is the present value — no drift that today’s information can see coming.
Exercise.
Show that in the coin toss example, if we had instead counted number of heads minus number of tails, would have been a martingale. For example, show that would have been equal to .
Relaxing the equality in either direction gives the two processes that drift one way on average.
Definition 1.9 (Supermartingale and submartingale).
With the same setup, is a supermartingale if
and a submartingale if the inequality runs the other way. A martingale is both.
The names are the wrong way round for anyone reading them as a description of the paths: a supermartingale is the one that decreases in expectation. They come from potential theory, where a function is superharmonic when its value at a point is at least its average over any surrounding sphere. Composing such a with a Brownian motion averages it over exactly those spheres, so is a supermartingale precisely when is superharmonic, and the two words describe the same inequality. In the language of chapter 3 the condition reads : a non-positive drift is what a supermartingale has.
Definition 1.10 (Stopping time).
A random time is a stopping time for the filtration if for every . Whether it has already happened must be decidable from what is known at , without looking ahead.
The first time a Brownian motion reaches a level, , is a stopping time — at any you know whether it has happened. The last time before that the path visits is not, because deciding it at time requires knowing that the path never returns. Every trading rule that can actually be followed is measurable in the first sense, which is why the condition appears wherever a strategy or an exercise decision does.
Given a stopping time, is the process stopped at : it follows until and is constant thereafter. Stopping preserves the martingale property, and it is the standard way to tame a process that is badly behaved only in the limit — the definition of a local martingale below is exactly that idea.
Definition 1.11 (Càdlàg path).
A path is càdlàg (continue à droite, limite à gauche) if at every time it is right-continuous and has a left limit. It may jump: at a jump the path takes its value on the right, and the left limit records what was approached from before. In any bounded interval a càdlàg path has at most countably many jumps, and for each only finitely many exceeding . A continuous path is càdlàg; the Poisson and jump processes of chapter 2 are càdlàg without being continuous, and are why the theorem below is stated this way. It is standard, and no real restriction, to take every martingale to have càdlàg paths.
Theorem 1.12 (Optional stopping).
Let be a càdlàg martingale and a stopping time. If is bounded, or if is uniformly integrable, then .
Proof.
Take first a with finitely many values . The whole argument is that the event is known by time , so the martingale property may be used on it:
| the martingale property | ||||
and because is a martingale. Notice what did the work. The indicator could be taken inside the conditional expectation only because it was measurable, and that is the definition of a stopping time — the only property of the calculation used. A random time that looked ahead would break the second line and nothing else.
A general bounded is a limit of such times. Put , which takes finitely many values, is a stopping time because , and decreases to . Each by the case just proved, and almost surely by right-continuity of the path, the approximating times decreasing to . The same case also identifies , and a family of conditional expectations of one integrable variable is uniformly integrable, so the convergence holds in and the expectations pass to the limit.
In the unbounded case the hypothesis does exactly the job boundedness did. The stopped process is a martingale, so for every finite , and almost surely as on ; uniform integrability is what upgrades that to and lets the expectation follow the limit. Without it the two cannot be exchanged, and the next paragraph is a case where they cannot. ∎
A finite stopping time is not enough on its own, and the gap is not a technicality. The doubling strategy of chapter 4 stops a Brownian motion at the first time it reaches , which happens almost surely, and collects from a process starting at zero. What fails is uniform integrability: the paths that have not yet reached the target are ever further below it, and the loss they carry is exactly what the expectation is missing. Ruling that out is the work done by admissibility.
Stopping also supplies the weakest useful version of the martingale property.
Definition 1.13 (Local Martingale).
A process is a local martingale if there are stopping times such that each stopped process is a martingale.
“Locally a martingale” says the process is a martingale up to a sequence of stopping times that eventually exhausts the horizon, which for many processes of interest is all one can guarantee. The gap between local and true is the same gap optional stopping left open, and it is not empty: the doubling strategy has a local martingale whose expectation moves. When the process is bounded below, though, half of the property survives.
The proof rests on two convergence facts for conditional expectation, the conditional forms of monotone convergence and Fatou, which recur whenever a local martingale is pushed to its limit.
Ordinary monotone convergence is the starting point: if then , both sides allowed to be infinite. An increasing sequence of non-negative functions has nowhere to put mass in the limit, so the integral tracks the pointwise limit exactly. Conditioning preserves this.
Lemma 1.14 (Conditional monotone convergence).
If almost surely then almost surely, for every sub--algebra .
Proof.
Conditional expectation is monotone, so increases almost surely to some -measurable . For each , ordinary monotone convergence on both sides of sends the left to and the right to . So for every , which with being -measurable is exactly . ∎
Lemma 1.15 (Conditional Fatou).
If then for every sub--algebra ,
Proof.
Put . These are non-negative and increase to , so conditional monotone convergence gives . And for every , so , whose right side rises to as . ∎
The inequality goes one way because the only grip on the limit is the approximation from below by the ; nothing approximates it from above unless the are dominated. Equality needs the mass held in place, which is what a dominating function or uniform integrability provides.
Lemma 1.16 (A non-negative local martingale is a supermartingale).
If is a local martingale then for .
Proof.
Let reduce , so each stopped process is a genuine martingale and . Because , almost every path has an past which , so and almost surely. The are non-negative, so conditional Fatou gives
∎
Structure (Where the expectation leaks).
Each has the same expectation as , being a stopped martingale, and the sequence converges almost surely to — yet can come out strictly smaller. Splitting on whether the localisation has bitten by time ,
and the first term increases to as fills out, so
The gap is the mass stranded on the paths already stopped: shrinks to null, but the value carried there need not shrink with it. Conditioning on runs the same split on every event known by time , which is why comes out as an upper bound and not an equality.
So a non-negative local martingale can lose expectation but never gain it, and it is a true martingale exactly when it loses none. chapter 4 is about which side of that line a discounted price has to be on.
Definition 1.17 ( Brownian motion).
A Brownian motion is a Brownian motion if is adapted to and is independent of for .
Remark (An Brownian motion is a martingale with respect to filtration ).
1.2 Itô Calculus
Definition 1.18 (Itô Integral).
Let be a adapted process and be a Brownian motion. The Itô integral is defined as
This is similar to the Riemann integral. One thing to note here is that the integrand always takes the value at the start of the interval. If we make the integrand take the the average of the values at interval endpoints, we get
Definition 1.19 (Stratonovich Integral).
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The two integrals usually do not give the same results, as can be checked by repeating the calculations we do in these notes for Stratonovich integral as well.
This is the first place stochastic calculus parts company with ordinary calculus, and the reason is visible in a single algebraic step. Take , so both sums are attempts at , and look at one interval. The Stratonovich term exceeds the Itô term by
so summing over the partition, the gap between the two integrals is exactly half the sum of squared increments. For an ordinary differentiable function that sum vanishes as the partition refines, and the two definitions agree — which is why nobody distinguishes them in ordinary calculus. For Brownian motion the sum of squared increments converges to , so the gap does not vanish — it tends to , and the Stratonovich integral of exceeds the Itô one by exactly that.
Structure (Which integral is the geometric one).
The two integrals differ by more than a convention.
Stratonovich obeys the ordinary chain rule: , with no second order term. So a Stratonovich equation transforms correctly under a change of coordinates — write the same process in a new variable and the equation you get is the one you would have written directly. Itô does not: its correction term depends on the coordinate chosen, so the same process has different-looking Itô equations in different variables.
That makes Stratonovich the integral of choice whenever geometry is involved — diffusions on a sphere, on a manifold of correlation matrices, on a Lie group — because there is no privileged coordinate for the equation to be written in. Finance uses Itô regardless: a trading strategy can only act on information already in hand, which forces evaluation at the left endpoint of each interval — Stratonovich’s midpoint rule would let the strategy trade on the increment it is about to receive — and that same left-endpoint rule makes a martingale whenever is one. Coordinate-invariance is what is given up in exchange, and finance, whose one natural coordinate is money, rarely needs it.
Both are used later. The point here is only that the choice is between coordinate-invariance and the non-anticipating rule — and the martingale property that comes with it — and one cannot have both.